Abstract-Optimal price of spectrum in secondary markets is studied. We consider a primary license holder who aims to lease the right to provide service in a given subset of its coverage area. Such a transaction has two contrasting economic implications for the seller: On the one hand the seller obtains a revenue due to the exercised price of the region. On the other hand, the seller incurs a cost due to (i) reduced spatial coverage of its network and (ii) possible interference from the leased region into the retained portion of its network. We formulate an optimization problem with the objective of profit maximization, and characterize its solutions based on a reduced load approximation. The form of optimal price suggests charging each admitted call in proportion to the attendant revenue loss due to the generated interference.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional regulatory framework of cellular wireless communications grants limited property rights to license holders of spectrum. Namely, a license holder can only provide a specific service on its allocated band and cannot resale any part of its license. Driven by efficiency of free markets a global regulatory effort is now underway to allow license holders to divide and sell their spectrum to other providers [2] , [9] .
Such spectrum markets appear to have unique aspects due to the possibility of spatial interactions among service providers caused by interference. In this paper we focus on one such aspect and study price of spectrum access rights within a spatial subregion of a cellular network.
We consider a spectrum license holder who aims to lease the right to provide service in a given subset of its coverage area. Such a transaction has two contrasting economic implications for the seller: On the one hand the seller obtains a revenue due to the exercised price, or lease, of the sold region. On the other hand, the seller incurs a cost due to (i) reduced spatial coverage of its network and (ii) possible interference from the leased region into the retained portion of its network. While in principle the pricing problem can be considered within the framework of monopolistic markets in classical microeconomic theory [I 1], complexity of network-wide consequences of interference presents a major hurdle in obtaining explicit solutions. Here we pursue reasonable approximations for optimal price of spectrum by resorting to reduced load approximations that have proved useful in analysis of telephone networks. We formulate an optimization problem with the objective of profit maximization and characterize solutions of the first-order optimality condition. Interpretation of the approximate form suggests that optimal price depends on the extent of interference generated outside the region, namely, it balances the corresponding loss of revenue incurred by the seller due to the influence of an admitted call.
Although pricing of communication networks is a wellstudied topic, the setting considered here is specific to spectrum markets and, to the best of the authors' knowledge, consideration of spatial aspects is new. In related work, [3] pursues interference based pricing in a single cell via adaptive optimization techniques, and [6] , [81 adopt a performance oriented viewpoint in considering dynamic spectrum access within a cell. Main contribution of the present paper is consideration of topological properties and spatial interactions due to generated interference.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections II and III describe respectively the teletraffic and economic aspects of the considered network model. Optimal pricing is formulated as a profit maximization problem in Section IV. The reduced load approximation employed in approximating the objective function is provided in Section V and the resulting optimal prices are given in Section VI for wideband networks and in Section VII for a specific narrowband network. The paper concludes with final remarks in Section VIII. Network models based on similar interference constraints have been considered in earlier works on cellular wireless CDMA networks. See, for example, [11 for an in-depth discussion of this model and specification of parameters wij and Kj in terms of physical layer parameters. Here we shall assume that the parameters wij and Kj are rational numbers; hence, without loss of generality in the feasibility condition (1) 
The seller has an expected rate of revenue over the term of a lease signed at price p. To keep the discussion general we succinctly denote this value by F(p). For the special cases alluded earlier in this section the expected revenue rate F(p) may take the following forms: a) Flat price: A flat price would be taken if it does not exceed the valuation of the commodity by potential buyers. Suppose that the seller's apriori perception of the market value of the spectrum in region L can be represented by a random variable V. The seller's expected rate of revenue generation from a flat price p might then be modeled by
The seller may price its spectrum per unit demand generated in the region L, in which case p refers to the revenue of the seller per call request in region L after the sale. The revenue rate of the seller would then be 
namely, the reduction in revenue generation from the service it provides to end-users. The seller aims to choose the price parameter p so as to maximize its profit F(p) -C(p); hence an optimal price for the seller solves: (6) In this paper we seek insight on the nature of optimal prices by focusing on characterizing solutions of the first-order condition (6 
iCN where G is a constant which ensures that 7p is a probability vector.
Let e(i) (ej(i): j E N) be such that ej(i) 1 (8) where the numbers bj (A), j C N, satisfy the equalities
bj(A) E ((1 bj (A))-EI wijAi (I iGN keN
-bk (A) )Wki, Kj (9) and E(, .) denotes the Erlang blocking formula E (p,i) = 1 TmO ! ) /! for all p > 0 and positive integer K. The set of equations (9) has a unique solution [5] ; hence the approximation is welldefined, and furthermore the solution is differentiable in A [4] .
The reduced load approximation above can be better motivated by first replacing the feasibility condition (1) by (10) S niwij <, jjN. iCN Note that this condition is more stringent than (1) in that it limits the interference on idle cells as well. Under the feasibility condition (10) Kj can be regarded as capacity of cell j and wi can be regarded as the units of capacity reserved from cell j per call in progress in cell i. The expression (8) then suggests that Bj(A) is the blocking probability at cell i in a hypothetical model where each unit of capacity is available independently with probability -bj(A) at link j, and furthermore availability of capacity is independent from link to link. Such a model is consistent only if the parameters bj(A) satisfy the fixed-point relation (9) .
The approximate blocking probabilities Bj (A) are asymptotically exact under the feasibility condition (10) along a limiting regime where the network arrival rates Aj and thresholds Kj increase in proportion [5] . While condition (10) Figure 1 is given in Table I . An accessible coverage of reduced load approximations and their limitations can be found in [7] .
VI. APPROXIMATE CHARACTERIZATION OF OPTIMAL PRICE
The tractable nature of reduced load approximations can be leveraged to obtain approximate expressions for the optimal price of spectrum. The conclusions of this section are valid under the following simplifying assumption: (1 1) p* = Z& 1-Bi (A(p*)))ai (P*) >i (P*) The derivatives that appear in the above expressions possess certain properties that can be useful in computing p*. Let cj (p) denote the quantity dd U(A(p)) for each value of the price p. Adaptation of Kelly's analysis [4] (P*)) Ewijd Q(A(p*)) (12) and Ei(p*) = p'(P is the price elasticity of demand in cell i.
The form (11) of an optimal price p* indicates that p* is the revenue generated from the region L by charging each admitted call in cell i C L an amount ai (p* where (i + 1)6 is understood as (i mod 6) + 1. For a given set of call arrival rates A, the equilibrium distribution of n is given by the expression (7).
For notational convenience let us define Kj = for each j 1, 2,... 6. The reduced load approximation for the network model yields the blocking probabilities VIII. CONCLUSION We considered the problem of optimal pricing of cellular wireless spectrum for trading in secondary markets. Pricing is posed as a profit maximization problem and a characterization of optimal price is obtained for general CDMA topologies and for a special case of narrowband networks. The applied technique is based on reduced load approximation and leads to an implicit form that allows interpretation of optimal price. In informal terms, optimal price of an admitted call in the sold region balances, up to a factor determined by price elasticity, the loss of revenue incurred by the seller due to admitting that call. Future directions of this work include investigating existence and uniqueness of optimal prices, and a computational framework for constructive solutions. ACKNOWLEDGMENT This work was funded in part by NSF through grants ANI-0238397, CCF-0430983, CNS-0435353, ANI-0132802, ANI-0240333, CNS-0435312.
